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The relationship between the military and the civilian government is one that has
defined the whole constitutional history of Brazil and could pave the way for a
collapse of democracy. In February 2021, an interview with the former commander
of the Brazilian Army, General Villas Bôas, was published in a book about him. Villas
Bôas commanded the Army from 2015 until 2019, acting mainly under Presidents
Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer. In the book, he explained a tweet he posted
in 2018 right before the trial by the Federal Supreme Court of former President
Lula’s writ of habeas corpus. In his tweet, he claimed that the Army shared the
repudiation of the ‘good citizens’ to impunity. The Federal Supreme Court, by a
majority of six against five (there are eleven justices in the tribunal), denied the writ
of habeas corpus and Lula was sent to jail. At the time, the message posted by the
Army general was seen as a pressure against the Federal Supreme Court to decide
against the former president.
Current revelations showed that this was an orchestrated movement at the high
echelon of the armed forces, and not just an individual act. On 14 February 2021,
a newspaper article reported that the content of the tweet was debated by three
of President Bolsonaro’s ministers and the army’s commander in order to limit its
language. The initial proposal contained suggestions of institutional interference by
the armed forces in the Federal Supreme Court. In fact, even President Temer’s
Minister of Defence at the time discussed the message with a retired general.
The threats made by General Villas Bôas demonstrate the fragility of the Brazilian
democracy. Conflicts between the military and courts have been growing, Bolsonaro
increasingly involves military personnel in politics and has made access to guns
easier for the general public. In a moment of rupture, Bolsonaro could count on
armed men beyond the members of the armed forces and military police. To
understand the perilous state of affairs of the civil-military relationship in Brazil, three
developments should be considered: the opposition of armed forces to transitional
justice in Brazil, the dimension of the movement of militarisation of politics and how
Bolsonaro is widening the access to guns in Brazil.
Opposition to Transitional Justice Measures
According to the interview with General Villas Bôas, the National Truth Commission
(NTC) that functioned in Brazil between 2011 and 2014 was set up as a type
of revenge. The NTC was a landmark in Brazilian transitional justice and was
supposed to investigate gross violations of human rights committed during the
military dictatorship of 1964-1985. Amidst the 29 recommendations made by the
NTC, there was the requirement that the armed forces made a public recognition
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that violations of human rights happened in their facilities. General Villas Bôas
understood that this kind of manifestation would be succeeded by criminal liability
– as it happened in Chile and Argentina. The military therefore never fulfilled this
proposition.
Several other recommendations made by the NTC in 2014 in its final report were
also never accomplished. Diverse measures of accountability have been barred:
the 2010 Federal Supreme Court ruling that validated the interpretation that the
1979 Amnesty Act was an obstacle for criminal liability of dictatorship’s agents
is still in place, despite an appeal filed against the decision that is still waiting for
trial. Although Brazil has been condemned by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights twice (in Gomes Lund and Herzog cases), almost fifty criminal procedures
have been halted by federal judges. There is an expectation that in the next few
weeks, in one case, a federal judge will decide which interpretation (the domestic
or the international one) shall prevail. In recognising the need for criminal liability,
courts signal to military officers that impunity will not prevail and that the rule of law
governs civilian and military authorities. The lack of criminal liability, however, can be
linked to criminal violence and the engagement of soldiers with national politics. In
addressing past violations of human rights, new democracies praise the rule of law,
strengthen its enforcement between soldiers and police officers and prevent them
from continuing unlawful policies built in the dictatorship era.
Militarisation of Politics
Military appraisal for constitutional institutions is not a reality in Brazil. The armed
forces were hesitant to admit their political involvement publicly. They defend
the necessity to preserve democracy and support that military political criticism
is not allowed by the law – the Military Disciplinary Regulations forbids political
expressions. Still, while the 1988 Constitution and the simultaneous fall of the
1964-1985 dictatorship had led to political silence, engagement with politics never
disappeared. Since the first directly elected president in 1989 until today, the military
has been acting like a factual veto power agent in politics.
During President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency (1995-2002), General
Alberto Cardoso, who was involved in the debate concerning Villas Bôas tweet,
was responsible for public security in the ministry of justice. President Cardoso was
partially successful in improving the civilian control of the armed forces through the
creation of the ministry of defence via the Constitutional Amendment 23 of 1999.
Although Article 142 of the 1988 Constitution clearly subordinates the armed forces
to the civilian authority of the president, the creation of the ministry of defence
– to be commanded by a civilian minister – provided another layer of protection
against military insurgency. Nonetheless, all presidential terms that followed the
constitutional reform had to deal with political crises inside the ministry of defence.
President Michel Temer (2016-2018), a very unpopular politician, needed to stabilize
his government which made him recur to the military and pave the way for their
return to politics. He nominated a member of the military to be his minister of
defence, breaking the informal rule followed by his predecessors of only choosing
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civilians. Coincidentally (or not) the general was also asked for advice on the
content of Villas Bôas political manifestation on Twitter – he was afraid of the
consequences of threatening the Federal Supreme Court with a blatant institutional
interference. President Temer also promulgated the Act 13.491 of 2017, which
makes it more difficult to establish the criminal liability of military involved in human
rights violations, assigning them to the criminal competence of the Military Justice
system. Another measure adopted by Temer’s administration responsible for
bringing back the military for the center of politics was the enactment of the criticized
federal intervention in the public security’s office of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The
former president nominated a general to command the administration of state and
federal agents (policemen and military) responsible for public security, and also
to deal with budgetary matters. Albeit the celebration of some politicians with the
engagement of the military federal intervention, its practical results were poor.
Jair Bolsonaro, a former military member, went deeper with the movement of
militarisation of politics. His government inserted around 6.100 soldiers in political
positions according to an investigation of the Federal Audits Court.
Arming the Population
The militarization process is not limited to politics. Under the presidency of Jair
Bolsonaro, and aiming at fulfilling a campaign promise, access to guns in Brazil
was widened and facilitated. Bolsonaro initiated this right from the start of his term.
In 2019, he issued diverse executive orders that created a juridical ‘mess’ on what
would be the prevailing regulations on access to guns. On 12 February 2021,
however, four new decrees allowed that common citizens could own up to six guns.
The move was done probably because Bolsonaro now counts on his allies holding
the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. Whereas in the
recent past those authorities could set for voting legal measures that could halt the
president’s executive orders, as they did, the chances for opposition are now low.
The most endangering aspect, however, is related to the close relationship and
sympathy Bolsonaro and his family nurture for militiamen. Former members of the
military police in the state of Rio de Janeiro, those supporters have been gaining
terrain in state and federal politics. They oppose, under certain circumstances,
the power of drug dealers and dominate huge areas, capturing votes and illegally
demanding that citizens pay for the services they control – such as gas supply,
transport and access to cable TV.
Free and wide access to guns is something that praises Bolsonaro’s most radical
supporters in the far-right, the militiamen. In that sense, an eventual support for
a radical collapse of democracy could count on armed men beyond the members
of the armed forces and military police in the states. A situation similar to what
happened in the transition from Trump’s presidency to Joe Biden’s administration in
the United States, including the Capitol riot, is not far from Brazilian political horizon.
Bolsonaro’ youngest son, representative Eduardo Bolsonaro, even suggested, in
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May 2020, that it is no longer a question of if, but of when a moment of rupture will
take place.
What Courts Did and What They Could Have Done
Federal Supreme Court’s Justice Edson Fachin published an official statement on
February 15, declaring that the threats made by General Villas-Bôas were intolerable
and unacceptable. In the following, a far-right radical congressman and former
military police officer, Daniel Silveira, published a video in which he threatened
the Federal Supreme Court’s Justices: he declared that he imagined the Justices
being beaten, that they should be sent to jail and that he would persecute them (the
video is now deleted). He also defended acts of the dictatorship. The video was a
response to Justice Fachin’s official statement. A Federal Supreme Court Justice
ordered the imprisonment of the congressman accusing him of violating the National
Security Act (Act 7.170 of 1983). His ruling was confirmed by a unanimous decision
of the bench. The Chamber of Deputies, the house to which the representative is
linked, shall decide on maintaining his status in prison.
The Federal Supreme Court reaction was an important sign against Bolsonaro’s
most radical supporters, although it is based on the dictatorship’s National Security
Act and has controversial arguments. Still, it does not touch the civil-military bonds.
The magistrates could also ask public prosecutors to open an investigation against
the involved military authorities for crimes against the National Security Act, which
forbids acts that aim at threatening the free functioning of the branches of power.
The indulgence displayed by Brazilian judges and courts towards unlawful political
engagement of the military is a high price paid by constitutional democracy. As
Haggard and Kaufman have shown, the ingredients for a weak democracy syndrome
are all present in Brazil: poor functioning of the institutions; enduring economic crisis;
and, praetorianism, that is, the absence of a civilian control of the military.
Leaked information indicates that the condemnation of former President Lula could
be nullified by the Federal Supreme Court in the future. If the court acts vigorously
to oppose former federal judge Sérgio Moro’s ruling, it will be demonstrated, one
more time, that Brazilian armed forces engage with politics unlawfully for diverse
reasons. First, because their political activity is forbidden by law. Second, because
they were trying to interfere in the Federal Supreme Court to obtain a verdict – Lula’s
imprisonment – that had no legal basis.
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